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The Sectarian Iceberg?  
 
Abstract: 
 
This article situates the contemporary evidential position on Scotland’s sectarianism within 
some longer-term and ongoing debates. It does so by addressing three key aspects of 
sectarianism in Scotland. Firstly it explores long-standing concerns about sectarianism in 
Scotland, and the puzzle that sectarianism frequently seems to be someone else’s problem. It 
then outlines some central evidential claims made about sectarianism in the 1980s and why our 
increasing knowledge about religion in Scotland’s social structure appear to bear them out. 
Finally, the article concludes by questioning how far we can conceive of ‘Protestants’ and 
‘Catholics’ as divided in the personal, informal and intimate spheres of contemporary Scottish 
life. 
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Introduction 
 
Key to the work of the Advisory Group on Tackling Sectarianism (AGoTS) was the desire to 
place robust evidence at the heart of understanding and addressing sectarianism in 
contemporary Scotland. Three articles in this Special Issue report new and important research 
commissioned by the Scottish Government on behalf of the Group. These studies were 
identified as addressing important gaps in existing knowledge around public attitudes towards 
sectarianism, the impact of sectarianism in local communities, and the possible impacts of 
marches and parades. It is important, however, to situate this new research within other sources 
of evidence and debate. In part this will be addressed by the Scottish Government’s 
forthcoming updated review of contemporary evidence in this area (Justice Analytical Services, 
2015). This article seeks to frame the contemporary evidential position within some of the 
longer-term and ongoing debates around sectarianism in Scotland. 
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It is necessary to insert an immediate disclaimer. I write here as an individual academic and as 
part of the Advisory Group, but by no means on its behalf. The views and conclusions of the 
Group as a whole can be read in its reports (AGoTS 2013, 2015). It is also necessary to note 
that the experience and privilege of being a member of the Advisory Group has added 
immeasurably to my understanding and appreciation of sectarianism in its Scottish context. In 
previous work I have argued that the notion of a ‘Sectarian Scotland’ operates as a myth. I 
concluded: “… Scotland is not a ‘sectarian’ society, at least when that term is used as [an] 
analytical concept rather than pejorative description. Scotland is an increasingly secular 
country where religion does not provide a significant marker of political or social cleavage” 
(Rosie, 2004: 144). A decade later – in an even more secularised Scotland – I continue to argue 
that there is very often ‘less’ sectarianism than meets the eye. However, it has also become 
very clear that the perception of a problem remains widespread, and that people – or some 
people at least – act upon those perceptions. If the work of AGoTS has one positive outcome 
is should be an encouragement for Scotland to ‘open the box’: for what is inside may be far 
less worrying than we fear.  
 
This article, then, will address three key aspects about sectarianism in Scotland. Firstly it 
explores long-standing concerns about sectarianism in Scotland, and the puzzle that 
sectarianism frequently seems to be someone else’s problem. It then outlines some central 
evidential claims made about sectarianism in the 1980s and why our increasing knowledge 
about religion in Scotland’s social structure appear to bear them out. Finally, the article 
concludes by questioning how far we can conceive of ‘Protestants’ and ‘Catholics’ as divided 
in the personal, informal and intimate spheres of contemporary Scottish life. 
 
 
Someone else’s problem… 
 
There are two quite distinctive senses in which sectarianism is ‘someone else’s problem’. First, 
the common claim that sectarianism is caused, initiated, or carried out by someone else. It is 
striking that few individuals, let alone organisations or groups, will volunteer themselves as 
being ‘sectarian’. Sectarianism becomes an accusation – something they do and we endure. 
This is not merely levelled across religion: there has long been a denial of responsibility 
through the accusation that sectarianism is exclusively the pastime of ‘neds’ and ‘knuckle-
draggers’. Religious defensiveness and class snobbery may be intimately intertwined. The 
second sense of distancing is that sectarianism happens to someone else. A variation of this 
second version is that it doesn’t happen around here though it happens, and is perhaps common, 
elsewhere. 
 
The two senses of someone else’s problem raise very different challenges for policymakers. 
The first can denote a refusal to acknowledge sectarianism as a problem in certain 
circumstances or contexts since such acknowledgement may imply (or be seen to imply) a 
sense of ‘responsibility’ or ‘blame’. This becomes very difficult for individuals or organisations 
who insist that the responsibility is not ‘theirs’ but someone else’s. In the absence of robust 
evidence (or even a consensus on what does or does not count as ‘sectarian’) this can lead to 
an ever diminishing vicious circle of outright denial and ‘what-about-ery’. As Walker (2000: 
125) has noted:  
 
The long-standing difficulties of debating this issue - of penetrating the fog of anecdote, 
grievance, claim and counterclaim in the absence of much hard evidence - have been 
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compounded by a sterile stand-off between demands for acknowledgement of guilt, and 
irritation about being invited to feel guilty. 
 
The only possible route out of this stand-off is the production of hard evidence, hence the 
AGoTS insistence that “attention [should be] given to evidence rather than allegation” (2013: 
8). The abundance of accusation (and a reluctance of many accusers to be concerned too much 
about actual evidence) fuels the second, and more sociologically nuanced, sense of this being 
‘someone else’s problem’. 
 
This latter sense exemplifies what might be called a social anxiety over sectarianism, a 
phenomenon broadly analogous to the more familiar concept of fear of crime (on ‘governing’ 
sectarianism see Flint, 2008). In short, this social anxiety operates through a widespread belief 
that sectarianism is a problem in Scotland, perhaps a serious one demanding attention, 
alongside the seeming paradox that relatively few people report that they have themselves 
directly experienced it. In other words, sectarianism is a problem, but not one that happens to 
me. Notably this seeming disjuncture between understandings of sectarianism as a general 
issue as compared to a personal problem is a common thread shared by much research into 
sectarianism in Scotland. Three contributions to this volume touch upon precisely that 
phenomenon. Ormston et al note that the perceived level of prejudice against both Catholics 
and Protestants (54 per cent of their respondents felt that there was at least ‘some’ prejudice 
against Catholics; 41 per cent that there was at least ‘some’ prejudice against Protestants) is 
considerably higher than the proportion in the survey (14 per cent) reporting that they had 
themselves experienced religious discrimination or exclusion. Likewise, whilst notable 
minorities felt that it was at least ‘quite likely’ that someone would be harassed or threatened 
in Scotland because they were Catholic (35 per cent) or Protestant (39 per cent), rather fewer 
(9 and 8 per cent respectively) felt that was likely in their own local area (see Ormston et al, 
2015: xx). Goodall et al report that whilst for some of their respondents “sectarianism is 
manifestly part of their everyday experience, for others it is almost invisible in their social 
world” (2015b: xx).Hamilton-Smith et al note the imagined association of both Loyalist and 
Irish Republic parades with “immediate disorder … [and] broader social anxieties about 
community cohesion and sectarianism”, but found both of these associations “hard to pin 
down” in practice (2015b: xx). 
 
These two worlds of Scottish sectarianism – general perception and personal experience - were 
evocatively illuminated by a study for Glasgow City Council which combined focus groups 
with a representative survey of adult Glaswegians. The research was conducted in 2002 and 
published in 2003 (NFO Social Research, 2003). Strikingly the research, amongst the most 
substantial conducted on sectarianism, received no media attention beyond a Sunday Herald 
article emphasising unsubstantiated claims that the study‘s report was “loaded and skewed”: 
“It is not a true reflection of what was discovered. That's been suppressed” (quoted in Mackay, 
2003). Claims of suppression were all the more bizarre since the research report was made, and 
remains, freely available on the Council website, whilst the study questionnaire, focus group 
topic guides, and full survey dataset were made available to researchers through the UK Data 
Archive (Hope & Martin, 2004). Perhaps because of these claims the Glasgow study has 
remained largely ignored in academic discourse (it is cited in Bruce et al, 2004; and Rosie, 
2004, but absent from many other accounts). That is particularly surprising since the results of 
the Glasgow study neatly preface much of the evidence presented in this Special Issue and are 
worth exploring. 
 
3 
 
A key finding of the NFO study was that whilst Glaswegians were confident in reporting that 
sectarianism, in a variety of forms, was ‘common’ in their city, they were unlikely to report 
having encountered it themselves over the previous several years. In other words, the 2002 
study illustrated – as does the 2014 Scottish Social Attitudes - a sharp disjuncture between how 
widespread respondents felt different forms of sectarianism were, and how rarely respondents 
claimed to have suffered them personally.  Table 1 illustrates a consistent pattern across eight 
different forms of ‘sectarianism’. For each, respondents were asked about the extent of the 
problem, and their own experience of it. Strikingly two-thirds of Glaswegians felt that sectarian 
violence was a common occurrence in their city (with 22 per cent thinking it very common). 
Yet of the 147 respondents (14 per cent of the survey) who reported that they had themselves 
been physically attacked over the previous five years – in itself a profoundly depressing statistic 
- seven (less than one per cent) believed that religion had been a contributing factor to the 
assault. Likewise a majority felt sectarian intimidation or harassment, sectarian threats, and 
sectarian vandalism were common in Glasgow, yet very few (in each of these cases less than 
one per cent) reported that they themselves had suffered it over the previous five years. As the 
Glasgow study noted, there was “a stark contrast between perceptions of prevalence and reports 
of experience” (NFO Social Research, 2003: 59):  
 
Table 1: Perceptions and Experiences of ‘sectarianism’ in Glasgow 
 
 
 
Form of sectarianism: 
Perception 
(% believing 
‘very’ or ‘quite 
common’) 
Experience 
(% claiming to 
have suffered in 
past 5 years) 
Employment Discrimination  24 1.1 
Different treatment by Council  13 0.5 
Different treatment by Police 20 0.3 
Different treatment by Public Services 15 0.2 
Sectarian violence 65 0.7 
Intimidation or harassment 54 0.4 
Threats 58 0.8 
Vandalism 65 0.6 
   
Base 1,029 1,029 
 
Source: NFO 2003: author’s own analysis. 
 
Like fear of crime, anxiety over sectarianism may not simply manifest itself as social unease. 
Individuals, it would seem likely, will act upon their anxieties in certain contexts. The Glasgow 
survey allowed us to modestly explore the effects of these strong perceptions of sectarianism, 
although it largely indicates where the effects do not seem to lie. The study asked, for example, 
whether there were areas of the city that respondents preferred to avoid, and, if so, why. The 
question was left open, and whilst many respondents named specific streets/territories of the 
city, others described more general contexts which they would avoid (“anywhere at night 
alone”; “areas where people are hanging around doing nothing”). A large minority of 
respondents (N = 391, or 38 per cent) said they avoided specific parts of the city, with around 
one in eight of these (N = 47) saying that this was because of their religion. In other words, 
around 5 per cent of the sample avoided certain parts of their own city for reasons connected 
with their religious identity. This compares to 4 per cent who would avoid certain areas because 
of where they themselves lived; 5 per cent because of their age; 6 per cent because of their 
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gender; and 6 per cent because of the football team they support. Whilst these figures are 
somewhat troubling, it also suggests that the vast majority of Glaswegians do not report such 
fears. Likewise, few of the 1,029 surveyed reported that their religion gave them grounds for 
having ‘safety concerns’ on public transport (n=14); feeling deliberately excluded from a social 
occasion (n=16); or being uncomfortable in a social situation (n=39). Notably, then, despite the 
clear perception amongst respondents that sectarianism was widespread in Glasgow, few 
reported specific experiences of it. When presented with the statement that “sectarianism 
affects me personally”, 12 per cent agreed whilst 69 per cent disagreed.  
 
These results suggested a rather generalised unease or anxiety around sectarianism in Glasgow, 
rather than entrenched aspects of the city’s life and geography which alarmed or worried 
respondents. This may fit with, for example, Hamilton-Smith et al’s account, in this volume, 
of how some Glasgow spaces assumed a sectarian character only in very particular contexts: 
“Only at specific moments might certain locations suddenly become laden with meaning and 
association” (Hamilton-Smith et al, 2015b: XX). Thus someone may not think of avoiding a 
particular area, street, or bus route due to worries about ethno-religious friction except where a 
specific parade, football match, or other event is, or is thought to be, occurring. The research, 
therefore, points towards a nuanced, episodic and highly contextual (and perhaps highly 
personalised) sense of unease around sectarianism. This suggests the need for a policy focus 
which accentuates, firstly, discussion of when people do or do not feel worried or unsafe and, 
secondly, reassurance that where unacceptable antisocial or criminal behaviour around 
sectarianism ensues it will be addressed and, if necessary, punished. This is not simply a matter 
of criminalising sectarianism – though a decade and more of religious hate-crime statistics 
suggest a continuing (and predominantly male and alcohol-fuelled) reservoir of low-level 
disruptive and threatening ‘conduct derogatory towards’ both Catholicism and Protestantism 
(see McKenna & Skivington, 2014; Rosie 2013). Rather there needs to be a sea change in 
attitudes on what is, and what is not, acceptable in everyday Scottish life. Such a change 
appears to be occurring in Scotland (and elsewhere) with regard to racism and to homophobia. 
There is, though, currently little evidence that Scots are confident that sectarianism can be, or 
is being, decisively tackled. In 2002 just 15% of Glaswegians agreed that “Sectarianism is 
becoming a thing of the past” (NFO Social Research, 2003). In 2014 66 per cent of Scots agreed 
that “sectarianism will always exist in Scotland” (Hinchliffe et al, 2015: 23).  
 
 
Life Chances: A sectarian iceberg? 
 
Writing more than a quarter of a century ago, in the precursor to this journal, Steve Bruce noted 
that there was  
 
… considerable superficial evidence of sectarianism, if by that rather loose journalistic 
term we mean the aggressive display in the public sphere of religious and ethnic 
differences which, in modern societies, are supposed to be confined to the private world 
as matters of ‘personal preference’.  
(1988: 151) 
 
Bruce’s argument was set against the context of a contemporary (indeed perhaps 
unprecedented) surge in academic interest in ethno-religious friction in Scotland. Some saw 
the outward signs of sectarian tension – football rivalry, paramilitary graffiti, and the like – as 
reflective of wider social divisions. Tom Gallagher, for example, reviewing Bill Murray’s 
(1984) volume on the Celtic-Rangers rivalry, noted that  “The hate and hysteria on display at 
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Old Firm matches does not tumble out of the social void” (Gallagher, 1985:44). Bruce, by sharp 
contrast, described such sectarian rivalry as “just a boy’s game” (1985: 248) and argued that:  
 
If we adopt the metaphor of an iceberg, I contend that the relatively rare public displays 
of sectarian animosity are not the visible tip of a submerged mass of ice but are rather 
all that is left. My critics believe that there is still a sizeable piece of sectarian ice under 
the surface.  
(1988: 151).  
 
By the late 1980s, therefore, a key parameter of the academic debate was set – how much ‘ice’ 
remained unseen? As Bruce noted on the subject of socio-economic opportunity: “What would 
be illuminating is evidence about the relative fortunes of Protestants and Catholics in West 
Central Scotland but such data are not presently available.” (1988: 155). 
 
Despite the subsequent expansion of robust and accessible data on religion and ethnicity in 
Scotland – not least the Censuses of 2001 and 2011 – evidence of systematic religious 
disadvantage (let alone sectarian discrimination) has proved remarkably elusive. Many 
accounts agree that employment discrimination was fairly widespread in the past, primarily by 
small, locally owned companies. Fundamental shifts in the labour market from the 1960s 
onwards reduced the capacity for discrimination as national or international firms, often with 
centralised and bureaucratised human resources departments, increasingly emphasised 
meritocratic approaches to staff recruitment and promotion (See, e.g., Paterson & Iannelli, 
2006; L. Paterson, 2000a, 2000b; Gallagher, 1987; Bruce, 2000). Such meritocracy – at least 
in recruitment - is largely based on educational credentials. Research by Lindsay Paterson 
suggested that “the occupational status of both younger Catholic men and younger Catholic 
women is now close to that of non-Catholics” (2000a:155). A key vehicle for this convergence, 
Paterson argued, was Scotland’s “system of distinctive and publicly funded Catholic schools” 
(2000b: 375).Williams & Walls, however, in their interpretation of the same occupational data 
insisted Catholic disadvantage was “indeed going but it is not yet gone” (2000:247).  
In more popular (and populist) discourse there have been persistent claims that a substantial 
degree of sectarian employment practices (and in many accounts specifically anti-Catholic 
discrimination) linger. In 1999 composer James MacMillan would claim that “anti-Catholicism 
[in Scotland], even when it is not particularly malign, is as endemic as it is second nature” 
(2000:15), provoking a fierce debate in the Scottish press and an edited collection exploring 
Scotland’s Shame? (Devine, 2000). That collection spanned a wide range of opinion, but 
demonstrated the relatively narrow range of (then) available evidence. Some accounts were 
entirely reliant on hyperbole and anecdote. Take, for example, the contribution of Patrick Reilly 
which began “To ask if there is anti-Catholicism in Scotland is like asking if there are 
Frenchmen in Paris” (2000: 29). Reilly’s argument was simple: there were simply too much 
“anecdotal evidence” about anti-Catholic discrimination to doubt that it was widespread and 
serious (2000: 31). Of course such elevation of anecdote to ‘proof’ (reversing the rule of thumb 
that ‘the plural of anecdote is not data’) brings profound difficulties of interpretation. Just how 
many anecdotal claims about a phenomenon, how widespread the perception of it, is required 
before we must assume that there is an underlying and significant social reality? How are we 
to judge between apparently contradictory anecdotal claims? Anecdote has, of course, its place 
– people understand their lives, after all, through ‘stories’ – but the absence of convincing 
empirical evidence, despite decades of popular and academic interest in sectarianism, casts 
serious doubt on claims of a Scotland riven by religious discrimination. 
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Subsequent work by Paterson & Iannelli (2006) utilised the 2001 Scottish Household Survey, 
one of the first available surveys with a sufficiently large sample size to accommodate robust 
statistical modelling. They concluded that for those entering employment from the 1950s 
onwards, there was “no evidence here that, for example, Catholics are widely discriminated 
against in the labour market, or extensively have to abandon their religion to gain high-status 
employment” (2006: 368). The underlying reason for this was:  
… essentially the equalizing of educational attainment among religious groups over 
time. Probably as a result of the academically successful system of Catholic schools, 
younger Catholics have almost the same distribution of attainment as younger people 
in other religious groups. That is not the case among older generations. These 
credentials are then rewarded in the labour market in broadly the same way for all 
religious groups, regardless of class of origin. In that sense, Catholics have benefited 
from meritocracy: the schools have given them access to certificates, and the certificates 
have allowed them to demonstrate their merit in seeking employment and social status.  
Paterson & Iannelli (2006: 374-375) 
More recent work by Paterson, Calvin and Deary addresses the “unanswered question … as to 
when broadly equal opportunity between Catholics and non-Catholics was achieved” (2014:2). 
Whilst the academic consensus had focussed on the introduction of comprehensive education 
in the 1960s, Paterson et al utilised the previously unavailable Scottish Mental Survey of 1947 
to investigate “whether the equalisation of opportunity may have occurred somewhat earlier” 
(2014:2). Their analyses suggested that Scotland’s “labour market as early as the 1950s was 
operating meritocratically” in terms of those who had “attended different denominations of 
school” (2014: 18). They thus conclude that: 
The policy changes that had the largest impact [in terms of educational and employment 
convergence] may have been those of liberal reformers with an ideology of merit-
selection in the period after 1918 rather more than of social-democratic reformers with 
more egalitarian beliefs after the 1960s.  
Paterson et al, (2014: 18) 
 
Strikingly, in the debate around religion and structural disadvantage little attention has been 
paid to what the 2001 Census can tell us. The formal report on religion in the Census noted 
only the overall figures across occupational class and other measures (Office of the Chief 
Statistician, 2005). Drawing upon these, the Scottish Government’s review of evidence on 
sectarianism noted that “Although now very dated [sic], the 2001 data showed quite clearly 
that there was little or no difference in the occupations of Catholics and those of the Church of 
Scotland” (Justice Analytical Services, 2013: 25). Consideration of structural religious 
disadvantage has often faced two profound and complex limitations. The first is the 
reproduction and privileging of a ‘Protestant/Catholic’ dichotomy which does not adequately 
reflect an increasingly secularised, perhaps post-Christian Scotland (see, e.g., Rosie 2004: 32-
39). Secondly, and more complexly, ‘bivariate’ analyses must be treated with caution given the 
interplay of religion, class, gender, generation and secularisation.  
 
Put simply, patterns of secularisation are very different for Protestants and Catholics, not least 
in terms of identity and belonging. As Brown (1997) has noted, the latter part of the twentieth 
century saw ‘a haemorrhage of faith’ in Scotland (as elsewhere) with increasing dislocation 
from formal religious activity, membership and belief. However, this dislocation hit earliest 
and hardest at liberal Protestant denominations and at the Church of Scotland in particular. 
7 
 
From a high of 1.3 million communicants in 1960, Kirk membership fell below one million by 
1980, and 0.7m by 1995. The last 20 years has seen sustained and rapid decline: to 0.5 million 
by 2005 and below 0.4m by 2013. Between 1990 and 2013 – that is, within a single generation 
- Kirk membership halved. Little of this is explained by a purposeful exodus out of the Kirk – 
rather it reflects a widespread drift away and a decades-long (and deepening) failure to recruit 
the young. The outcome of this, over several generations, is arresting. 
 
Table 2 reports how respondents in the Scottish Social Attitudes, broken down across age 
category, answered the question “do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular 
religion?” Here we focus only upon the three largest groups – those identifying with the Church 
of Scotland (representing a very large majority of those we might describe as ‘Protestant’), 
with the Roman Catholic Church, and those who described themselves as being of ‘no religion’.  
Results from the earliest (1999) and latest publicly available (2013) editions are shown to 
illustrate the rapidly shifting context: 
 
 
Table 2: Religious belonging by age group, 1999 & 2013 
 
 1999  2013 
 Church of 
Scotland 
Catholic No 
religion 
 Church of 
Scotland 
Catholic No 
religion 
        
ALL 35 14 40  18 13 54 
        
18-24 18 16 56  2 9 77 
25-34 19 18 54  5 14 63 
35-44 29 14 43  11 15 59 
45-54 38 10 45  14 11 57 
55-64 47 10 29  24 16 47 
65+ 52 18 22  42 12 31 
        
N =  518 201 590  271 193 802 
 
Source: SSA 1999; SSA 2013. 
 
The first point to take from table 2 is the quite remarkable decline of overall Church of Scotland 
identification in a relatively short period (from 35 to 18 per cent), alongside the stability of 
Catholic identification and a notable increase (from 40 to 54 per cent) in those describing 
themselves as being of no religion. The second point is even more striking: whilst in 1999 the 
Church of Scotland profile was highly gradated across age, their 2013 profile suggested nothing 
short of a collapse amongst all but the oldest category. Whilst it is difficult to clearly identify 
cohort effects in non-longitudinal data, it does seem likely that the decline in Church of 
Scotland identification relates not simply to the emergence, and subsequent ageing, of 
relatively secularised cohorts. Rather, there seems to be some evidence that cohorts may be 
increasingly discarding their Church of Scotland identification as they grow older. 
 
Whatever the complex historical trajectory, the blunt fact is that, in relative terms, very few 
Scots aged under 45 describe themselves as Church of Scotland. Catholic figures are more 
variable but do not suggest any such calamitous decline. In all but two age categories in 2013 
a majority of Scots were of ‘no religion’, and amongst the youngest age groups this was a large 
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majority. In the second oldest age category ‘no religion’ constituted almost half of the 
respondents. 
 
Table 2 thus illustrates two crucial points. Firstly, we cannot simply compare religious groups 
and conclude that any observable differences are ‘religious’ differences. There would be a 
strong possibility that such differences may reflect the very distinctive age profiles of the 
groups. Secondly, restricting any analysis of such data to comparison of the two main religious 
groups excludes a very substantial proportion of Scots – and most young Scots – from 
consideration. 
 
Given these crucial caveats, do we find much evidence that the ‘life chances’ of contemporary 
Scots are shaped by their religion? A useful way to explore this is through the Individual 
Licenced Sample of Anonymised Records (I-SAR) based on a 3% sample of the 2001 Census1. 
Table 3 reports the occupational classification of the ‘Household Reference Person’ across the 
three largest religious groupings in I-SAR 2001: 
 
 
Table 3: Occupational class of Household Reference Person and religion, 2001  
 
 Church of 
Scotland 
 
Catholic 
No  
religion 
Higher managerial, administrative and professional  30 30 34 
Intermediate occupations 13 13 12 
Small employers and own account workers 8 6 7 
Lower supervisory and technical occupations 11 10 10 
Semi-routine occupations 18 18 17 
Routine occupations 15 17 14 
Never worked and long-term unemployed 4 7 5 
 41,908 15,217 28,310 
 
Source: I-SAR 2001  
NB - Authors own recoding of NS-SEC classification2  
 
The differences we can observe in table 3 are statistically significant (p = .000)3 but very 
modest. But the question remains, given the differential impacts of secularisation: might the 
age structures of the major faith groups matter? For example, whist 60 per cent of all people 
sampled in I-SA are aged 0-44 years, this proportion rises to 62 per cent amongst Catholics and 
75 per cent amongst those of no religion, and falls to 48 per cent amongst those identifying as 
Church of Scotland. Likewise, seven per cent of the sample overall are aged 75+, but this is 
lower amongst Catholics (six per cent) and no religion (two per cent), and higher (eleven per 
cent) amongst Church of Scotland identifiers. In other words the Church of Scotland profile is 
considerably older (indeed ‘elderly’) than that of Catholics, which in turn is somewhat older 
than the profile of those of no religion. What happens to occupational differences when we 
control for age? 
1 For further information on I-SAR 2001 http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=7205 
2  On the NS-SEC classification see https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/archives/nssec 
3 It should be noted, of course, that very large sample sizes – as with I-SAR – are likely to show 
statistical significance for small differences.  
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The first thing to note is that when we control occupational class for age, we find statistically 
significant differences between the three key religious groups in seven of eight age categories. 
Only in the youngest (those aged 16-19) do we find that observable differences are not 
statistically significant (p = .278). But, again, most of the statistically significant differences 
prove to be very modest indeed. There were 56 possible combinations of class/age (the seven 
different occupational classes described in table 3 across eight age brackets): the largest 
differences between the three main religious groups prove to be less than five percentage points 
in forty-seven of these. The nine categories where we do find a difference of five percentage 
points or more are reported in table 4. 
 
Table 4 neatly demonstrates several things about occupational class, age group and religion in 
contemporary Scotland. First, the categories in which we find ‘notable’ differences (here 
crudely defined as five or more percentage points between any pairing of the three main 
religious groups) are relatively scarce – we find such differences in just nine of the 56 possible 
categories. Secondly it is clear that most of these relatively rare differences are found in the 
three oldest age brackets. In the 45 possible categories for respondents aged 16-59 we find just 
two with ‘notable’ differences: in the 21 possible categories for those aged 60+ we find seven. 
 
 
Table 4: Categories of difference: Occupational class and religion, 2001  
 
  Church of 
Scotland 
 
Catholic 
No 
religion 
     
20-24 Intermediate occupations 18 23 17 
     
45-59 Higher managerial etc. 31 30 40 
     
60-64 Higher managerial etc. 27 23 33 
60-64 Semi-routine occupations 19 20 14 
     
65-69 Higher managerial etc. 27 23 32 
65-69 Routine occupations 18 24 20 
     
70-74 Higher managerial etc. 22 21 30 
70-74 Lower supervisory etc. 14 9 16 
70-74 Never worked/long-term 
unemployed 
10 17 10 
 
Source: I-SAR 2001  
 
But a third point is crucial – no consistent pattern of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is discernible, and 
often the differences between Church of Scotland and Catholic (as we can also see in Table 3) 
are more modest than differences between these two groups and people of no religion. Indeed 
in only four categories do Presbyterian-Catholic differences amount to five or more percentage 
points. If we were to classify the first three occupational groups (as listed in table 3) as 
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relatively privileged and the last four as relatively under-privileged, then these notable 
differences would amount to two cases of relative Catholic privilege over Church of Scotland 
identifiers, and two of relative Catholic under-privilege.  
 
An apparent pattern of relative privilege for the no religion group - over-represented in the 
‘highest’ occupational categories in four of the age groups - is interesting and should give pause 
for thought. Much of the discourse on religion and occupational class assumes that it is religion 
that might shape a person’s class position rather than the other way about. In other words, a 
person’s religion is assumed to be independent of their class, but their class may be shaped by 
their religion (as one example, through discrimination against certain religious minority 
groups). But it is also possible that the relationship works the other way around, and that 
occupational class helps shape a person’s self-identity. In other words, occupational ‘success’ 
or ‘failure’, mobility or immobility might impact on a person’s religious (in)activity and thus 
how they might choose to describe their religion. Such questions are beyond the capacities of 
this paper and, in all probability, beyond the existing data, but they indicate important questions 
about ‘causality’, and what might underlie the patterns that we observe (on which, see Paterson 
& Iannelli, 2006).  
 
 
 
Life Choices: You Dancin’? 
 
If it is difficult to pinpoint consistent and structured differences across key religious groups in 
term of ‘life chances’, might we find evidence of social distance and differentiation in terms of 
‘life choices’? In other words, do Scots report that the decisions they make across various 
aspects of their lives are informed, shaped, or limited by their religion? Returning to the 2002 
Glasgow study, Table 5 reports how respondents viewed the relevance of their religion to a 
range of such decisions: 
 
Table 5: Religion and ‘life choices’ in Glasgow, 2002 
 
Have you ever felt that your 
religion was relevant to … 
Church of 
Scotland 
Catholic No 
religion 
    
Who you could have as a friend 4 6 4 
Who you could date or marry 10 8 7 
What jobs you could apply for 6 13 6 
Where you could live 5 8 6 
Social clubs you could join 11 22 14 
    
Base 348 288 249 
 
Source: NFO 2003: author’s own analysis. 
 
 
Three aspects of table 5 seem particularly noteworthy. Firstly differences between the key 
groups on some questions are fairly modest. Relatively few Glaswegians, for example, felt that 
their religion shaped where they could live or who they could befriend. These 2002 results 
chime well with the evidence from the 2014 Scottish Social Attitudes which found that very 
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large majorities of Catholics (81 per cent) and Protestants (76 per cent) could count at least one 
person from the ‘other’ religion as a close friend (Hinchliffe et al, 2015: 13). 
 
Secondly, where we do find differences a simplistic reading is difficult to sustain. For example 
we might be struck by the difference between the six per cent of Church of Scotland identifiers 
and the 13 per cent of Catholics who felt their religion was relevant to the jobs they could apply 
for. Yet – though not shown in table – the fact that 14 per cent of ‘other Christians’ also felt 
this makes an easy assumption of Protestant-Catholic difference difficult to sustain. Likewise 
though 22 per cent of Catholics reported that their religion was relevant to which social clubs 
they could join, this was also the case for 21 per cent of ‘other Christians’ and 20 per cent from 
‘other religions’. 
 
Thirdly, religious inter-marriage and intimate relationships did not seem particularly 
problematic. Across the three key religious groups most Glaswegians did not report that their 
religion was relevant to who they could date or marry. Likewise whilst some in the Glasgow 
study who were themselves in a mixed religion relationship reported adverse reactions to them 
crossing the supposed ‘divide’, these tended to be a relatively modest minority. Table 6 defines 
‘disapproval’ of a mixed religion relationship very widely as encompassing reports that others 
disapproved ‘a little’, ‘quite a lot’, and ‘a great deal’. Even such a broad definition of 
disapproval fails to find evidence that most people entering mixed relationships face substantial 
difficulties. There is some evidence that Protestant-Catholic relationships face a little more 
disapproval (in particular from one’s family and from the Churches) than other kinds of mixed 
religion relationship. However, this must be tempered by the fact that the vast majority of 
respondents across all categories – at least 82 per cent – did not report any no disapproval to 
their relationship: 
 
Table 6: Disapproval of mixed religion relationships, Glasgow, 2002 
 
 (% describing disapproval on the part 
of:) 
In Protestant-
Catholic relationship 
All other mixed 
religion relationships 
   
Friends 2 2 
Partner’s friends 3 3 
Family 17 10 
Partner’s family 14 13 
Church/religion 10 7 
Partner’s Church/religion 18 8 
   
Base 99 127 
 
Source: NFO 2003: author’s own analysis. 
 
 
We can approach such intimate questions not simply through what people say about 
themselves, but through what they do. The 2001 Census allowed us an unparalleled opportunity 
to measure the extent of mixed religious marriage in Scotland. Fascinating and advanced 
analysis can be found in Raab & Holligan (2012) – for our purposes, here, however, the broad 
patterns will suffice since they are immensely revealing. 
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The extent of religiously mixed marriages and relationships in the 2001 Census demonstrates 
that any human boundaries between religious traditions are highly permeable at even this most 
intimate level. As table 7 shows, the 2001 Census recorded almost 400,000 Scottish Catholics 
who were living with a spouse or partner. In almost half these cases (47 per cent) that 
spouse/partner was not Catholic. More than a quarter of Catholics (27%) were married to, or 
cohabiting with, a Protestant: 
 
Table 7: Catholics and mixed marriages/relationships, 2001 
 
CATHOLICS MARRIED COHABITING 
Religion of Partner: % % TOTAL 
None 13.4 28.9 17.1 
Church of Scotland 22.0 29.2 23.7 
Roman Catholic 59.4 33.9 53.3 
Other Christian 3.4 4.7 3.7 
Another Religion 0.2 0.9 0.3 
Not Answered 1.4 2.5 1.7 
    
 299,190 93,488 392,678 
 
Source: Census of Scotland, 2001 – author’s own analysis. 
 
These data hardly indicate the existence of carefully bounded and patrolled religious 
communities – Catholics are very likely to find their life-partner outside the faith, and the fact 
that this is even more marked amongst those who are cohabiting suggests that exogamy 
amongst younger Catholics is remarkably high.  
 
How do Scotland’s Catholics compare with their neighbours? Table 8 reports the rate of 
endogamy (i.e. in-group marriage) amongst a range of religions across Scotland as a whole, 
and within Glasgow. Here, for ease of presentation, only marriages (and not cohabitations) are 
shown. Two religious groups show markedly high rates of in-marriage, with most married 
Muslims (89 per cent across Scotland) and Sikhs (86 per cent) married to a person of the same 
faith:  
 
Table 8: Extent of religious endogamy, Scotland & Glasgow, 2001 (selected religions) 
 
% married to 
spouse of same 
religion 
None Church 
of 
Scotland 
Catholic Hindu Jewish Muslim Sikh 
 
Scotland 
 
 
67.4 
 
81.3 
 
59.4 
 
81.6 
 
71.3 
 
88.7 
 
86.1 
 
Glasgow 
 
 
65.1 
 
75.3 
 
68.8 
 
85.7 
 
62.2 
 
93.0 
 
91.1 
 
Source: Census of Scotland, 2001 – author’s own analysis. 
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By sharp contrast Church of Scotland identifiers and Catholics are much more likely to marry 
outwith their religious group. Despite widespread assumptions of a ‘sectarian divide’ between 
Scotland’s – and in particular Greater Glasgow’s – Protestants and Catholics, the Census 
reveals that around one-third of Glasgow’s Catholics and one quarter of Church of Scotland 
identifiers have ‘married out’. That the Glasgow rate of out-marriage amongst Catholics is 
lower than in Scotland as a whole reflects the greater concentration of Catholics in west central 
Scotland. In short, if a Glasgow Catholic were to randomly select a fellow Glaswegian as a 
marital partner they would be more likely to marry a fellow Catholic than would be the case 
for, say, Catholics in Aberdeen or Inverness. That springs from the simple fact that there were 
proportionately far more Catholics in Glasgow in the 2001 Census (29 per cent) than in 
Aberdeen (6 per cent) or Inverness (8 per cent). The reverse demographic pattern will, in part, 
explain the lower relative rate of Church of Scotland endogamy in Glasgow than in Scotland 
as a whole. 
 
Previous studies4 have suggested that Protestants and Catholics (and, indeed, the irreligious) 
are very like each other in terms of their political and social attitudes, and to a large extent we 
now know why. The Census data on intermarriage, alongside the evidence noted above on 
friendship networks, serve to signal that religious communities are not discrete and bounded 
entities inhabiting separate social worlds. The boundaries between religious groups may be 
very porous indeed, and ‘different’ communities may be connected by, and within individual 
life histories, friendship networks, families and life partners. Religious conflict with ‘the Other’ 
– indeed the very conception and relevance of ‘Other’ – becomes difficult to sustain when it is 
one’s partner, father, sister, or child who ‘kicks with the other foot’. Neither is intermarriage a 
recent phenomenon. Bernard Aspinwall (2000: 56) found: 
 
 
… surprising numbers of mixed marriages from the nineteenth century to the present. 
Even if a number of these were between marginal or lukewarm Catholics and nominal 
Protestants, such evidence undermines hitherto unquestioned assumptions about a 
prevalent feverish bigotry until recent times. My discussions with elderly [Catholic] 
faithful invariably reveal surprising numbers of mixed marriages and Protestant 
relations in their forefathers’ backgrounds. A curious, selective amnesia prevails in our 
interpretation of our past. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s the problem with ‘sectarianism’ from a sociological perspective was 
the relative lack of empirical data with which to gauge its prevalence. The problem from the 
2000s onwards was to explain the increasingly apparent divide between perceptions of 
sectarianism and experience of it. Some tentative answers have been hinted at here. 
Sectarianism, like crime, is a ‘bad thing’ which individuals are wary of. Like crime, 
sectarianism looms rather larger in most people’s imaginations than in most people’s actual 
experience. A generation ago, Bruce (1988: 151) argued that ‘the relatively rare public displays 
of sectarian animosity are not the visible tip of a submerged mass of ice but are rather all that 
is left’. Since then the emerging empirical evidence – soon to be augmented by further releases 
from the 2011 Census - has largely bolstered Bruce’s view about the ‘sectarian iceberg’. 
4 See, e.g., McCrone & Rosie, 1998; Rosie & McCrone, 2000; I. Paterson, 2000; Bruce et al, 2004; Rosie, 2004, 
2014a, 2014b, 2014c. 
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Whatever the position in the past (on which detailed historical study is surprisingly limited), it 
is now clear that in terms of key life chances– access to education, to jobs, to opportunities for 
social mobility – there is little evidence of significant, let alone systematic, differences between 
Protestants, Catholics and the irreligious. Additionally, sectarianism does not seem to be a 
shaping, let alone a determining, factor in life choices – a person’s political and social values, 
networks of friends and family, and choice of romantic partner. By and large, Scotland’s 
Protestants and Catholics think and act like each other, and indeed live, work and make babies 
together, rather more than the truisms around ‘sectarianism’ would suggest. 
 
Nevertheless whatever the empirical evidence relating to the ‘iceberg’, it seems clear that many 
Scots are genuinely worried about sectarianism, its prevalence, and its impact. Perceptions, in 
other words, matter. The research detailed elsewhere in this Special Issue points towards how 
sectarianism (whether in terms of generalised anxiety or actual lived experience) impacts upon 
real lives and real communities.  The Scottish Government has provided key leadership in 
unpacking sectarianism so that we can understand and tackle it. Other public bodies too (not 
least the Police and the Courts) have played a leading role in addressing some of the more 
explicit manifestations of sectarian misbehaviour. In its Interim Report, AGoTS noted that 
elsewhere in Scottish life there was often a dispiriting lack of leadership, and called for more 
confidence in tackling sectarianism. Such confident leadership, at the very least, would help to 
tackle the widespread social anxiety over sectarianism in contemporary Scotland: 
 
 
Those in positions of responsibility, including those in organisations and institutions 
where sectarianism has played a historic role - such as the churches, local authorities, 
football clubs, public services, the professions, journalism, schools, parading 
organisations, community organisations and youth services - should develop pro-active, 
visible and sustainable approaches to identify and address both persistent and residual 
sectarianism in their organisations, communities and areas of influence.  
(AGoTS, 2103: 5) 
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